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NOTES
NONCONSENSUAL U.S. MILITARY ACTION AGAINST
THE COLOMBIAN DRUG LORDS UNDER
THE U.N. CHARTER
Under current foreign policy, the United States will not deploy mili-
tary troops to eradicate cocaine crops and processing facilities in the ter-
ritory of a drug-producing nation absent a request from that nation's
government.1 Colombia, which produces eighty percent of the world's
cocaine,2 has not requested that the United States take such action.3 As
a result, current policy prevents the United States from undertaking po-
tentially effective military action to strike at what is considered the heart
of the cocaine trade.
The United States therefore has three options with respect to military
involvement. The United States may (1) elect not to deploy troops to
Colombia, (2) pressure Colombia to request such military action, or (3)
alter foreign policy and deploy troops into Colombia without Colombia's
consent. Choosing from among these options requires an analysis of
complex domestic and foreign policy issues beyond the scope of this
Note. It is clear, however, that the legality under international law of
executing each option should carry some weight in the calculus of na-
tional policy.4
This Note specifically addresses the legality of the third option under
the United Nations Charter's provisions governing the use of force. Part
I summarizes the scope of the drug problem and current attempts to
control it, outlining the likelihood of nonconsensual military action
under existing political conditions. Part II discusses international law
governing world nations' use of force and identifies prevalent views re-
garding its limits and application. Part III applies these views of interna-
1. N.Y. Times, Sept. 1I, 1989, at Al, col. 4; Boston Globe, Sept. 6, 1989, at 1; Reggie Walton,
Associate Director for Drug Policy, Statement on Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 5,
1989) ("Until we receive a request from the Colombian government to intervene, we don't deem it
appropriate to do so by sending in troops.").
2. Bagley, Colombia and the War on Drugs, 67 FOREIGN AFF. 70 (Fall 1988).
3. Colombia's President Barco clearly has opposed the operations of an American strike force
in Colombia. N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1989, at Al, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
4. For a brief discussion of the controversy surrounding enforcement of international law, see
infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
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tional law to possible use of military action by the United States to stop
the growth and manufacture of illicit drugs in Colombia without that
government's consent. Part IV discusses the significance of such action's
legality under international law in formulating a national policy on the
Colombian drug problem.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG CRISIS
Drug use exacts a substantial and rising cost from American society,S
leaving little question of America's incentive to cut off the drug trade.
Not including drug-related crime, reported deaths from drugs rose from
2,825 in 1981 to 4,138 in 1986.6 In 1986, 120,000 emergency room ad-
missions7 and ten to fifteen percent of all highway fatalities were drug
related.8 Most experts see a strong link between drug use and teenage
suicide.9 Twenty percent of convicted murderers admit they were using
drugs prior to committing homicide. 10 Drug abuse caused approxi-
mately 100 billion dollars in economic damage to American society in
1986. 1 This estimate does not attempt to measure the pain and suffering
5. Eisenbach, Why America is Losing the Drug War, HERITAGE FOUNDATION REP., No. 656
(June 9, 1988). The United States is the world's largest consumer of illicit drugs, with an estimated
one in ten Americans using illegal drugs at least monthly. NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: POP-
ULATION ESTIMATES 1985, at 10 (1987).
6. NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., ANNUAL
REPORT: DATA FROM THE DRUG ABUSE WARNING NETWORK, SERIES 1, No. 1, at 43 (1981)
[hereinafter NIDA 1981 REPORT]; id., SERIES 1, No. 6, at 81 (1986) [hereinafter NIDA 1986 RE-
PORT], cited in Eisenach, supra note 5, at n.21.
7. NIDA 1981 REPORT, supra note 6, at 22; NIDA 1986 REPORT, supra note 6, at 26. The
NIDA reports also indicate that, while the overall number of drug-related emergency room admis-
sions remained fairly constant between 1981 and 1986, the number of cocaine-related emergency
room admissions rose by more than 500%. Id.
8. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., THE INCI-
DENCE OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS: AN UPDATE OF THE STATE OF KNOWL-
EDGE VI (1985), cited in Eisenach, supra note 5, at n.22.
9. See, e.g., Holden, Youth Suicide: New Research Focuses on a Growing Social Problem, ScI-
ENCE, August 22, 1986, at 839, 839-41.
10. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS AND DRUGS 4
(1983), cited in Eisenach, supra note 5, at n.27.
11. Eisenach, supra note 5, at n.28. The annual economic damage resulting from drug abuse
was $60 billion in 1983. Consumption cost alone amounted to $11 billion in 1988. Id. Further-
more, part of this economic cost stemmed directly from the use of drugs in the workplace. Studies
have shown that drug users are three times as likely to be involved in on-the-job accidents, are absent
from work twice as often, and on the average incur three times the amount of medicine costs as
nonusers. Id.
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associated with tragedies such as drug-related deaths.12
The drug problem also affects producer states,' 3 particularly Colom-
bia, where internal violence attributable to the drug trade abounds.14
Armed guerrillas funded by drug lords control entire territorial blocks.15
Corruption is so widespread that the Colombian judicial system has vir-
tually ceased to function.16 The Colombian government, intimidated by
12. Id.
13. In international law, a nation is referred to as a "state." Major producer states include:
Afghanistan, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Colombia, Iran, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Syria, and
Turkey. Moore, New Strategy for a War on Drugs? 20 NAT'L J., Mar. 12, 1988, at 678.
Producer-state government policies regarding the drug problem vary. While some states ineffec-
tively attempt to resist the drug trade, others either acquiesce to it or actively support it. For exam-
ple, a Bolivian statesman declared, "[w]e want them to know that at least one foreign country...
has itself been invaded and exploited by international drug traffickers and producers and we intend
to work to stop it ...." Statement of Dr. Guillermo Bedregal, Foreign Minister of Bolivia, to the
National Press Club, Washington, D.C. Federal Information Systems Corp., Federal News Service,
Oct. 3, 1988. And according to a U.S., representative, "Ly]ou get lip service support from the [Co-
lombian] government on narcotics matters but nothing else." HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMM.,
93D CONG., 1sT SESS., THE WORLD NARCOTICS PROBLEM: THE LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
24 (Comm. Print 1973). The Medallin drug traffickers have attempted to gain greater political
power. One Medallin leader, Pablo Escobar, sought to create a political following by handing out
cash and building low-income housing and sports stadiums. Escobar was elected an alternate con-
gressman in 1982. There are persistent rumors that congressional and even presidential campaigns
receive substantial backing from the drug lords. Bagley, supra note 2, at 77. General Manuel
Noriega of Panama was widely suspected of affirmatively aiding and profiting from the Panamanian
drug trade.
14. Colombia is one of the most violent countries in the world. The estimated murder rate is
higher than it was during the peak years of La Violencia-the Colombian civil war of 1948-58 in
which 200,000 people were killed. Bagley, supra note 2, at 71. Colombia's drug bosses have been
responsible for the assassination of one minister ofjustice, one attorney general, more than 50 judges,
at least a dozen journalists, and more than 400 police and military personnel. Id. Many believe that
the Medellin cartel paid guerrillas $1 million to occupy the capital's Palace of Justice in 1985, an
incident ending in the deaths of all the Supreme Court justices and approximately 80 persons, as well
as the complete destruction of the Palace. Id. at 83. Furthermore, in 1986 the drug lords kid-
napped the Conservative Party's presidential candidate. In the wake of his abduction, former Presi-
dent Misael Pastrana Borrero declared that "this country is in flames .... Last year I said we were
on the verge of the abyss. Today, I think we are in the abyss." Id. at 73 (citing Oppenheimer, Rising
Violence Rips Colombia, Miami Herald, June 12, 1988, at Al, col. 1).
15. The limited presence or total absence of government institutions in large areas of the na-
tional territory hampers efforts to combat crime. Bagley, supra note 2, at 72. According to Mexican
officials, the drug traffickers control the Pacific state of Sinaloa. Gardner, Conspiracy to Corrupt,
FIN. TIMES LTD., Feb. 14, 1987, at 1. For the purposes of international law, however, this territorial
control by the drug lords is probably insufficient to make a potential invasion of Colombia by the
United States not a "use of force" under Article 2(4). See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying
text.
16. "Consider the options. A judge can accept a bullet through the head or a $50,000 bribe."
Debusmann, Anti-Drug Campaigns in Latin America Fail to Curb Production, REUTER LIBRARY
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violence17 and corrupted by money, is effectively paralyzed from comply-
ing with extradition treaties and other international drug control
obligations.18
The international community has responded to the drug problem.' 9
One hundred and fifty-five states, including Colombia, have ratified the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (Single Convention) since its adop-
tion by the United Nations in 1961.20 The Single Convention requires
participating nations to restrict municipal cultivation, manufacture, and
distribution of drugs to licensees."1 It also requires nations annually to
disclose to the International Narcotic Control Board the amount of
drugs produced, consumed, seized, or stockpiled. 2 Further, the single
convention requests discretionary cooperation among participating na-
tions to eradicate illicit drug trafficking, and recommends penal sanctions
against offenders.23
The United States is attempting to reduce drug demand at the munici-
REP., Mar. 3, 1988, at 1. Such a choice explains why cocaine traffickers rarely go to court these
days.
17. Violence and threats of violence also have been directed against U.S. nationals. For exam-
ple, in February 1985 the drug lords' enforcement troops (the Narcos) murdered U.S. Drug Enforce-
ment Agency officer Enrique Camarena. Gardner, supra note 15, at 1. Cartel kingpin Carlos Lehder
gave an interview on national television during which he appealed to discontented military officers
and Marxist revolutionaries to join him in the "cocaine bonanza... the arm of the struggle against
... the Achilles' heel of American imperialism." Bagley, supra note 2, at 86. After his arrest in
1988, Lehder threatened to kill five Americans for every Colombian extradited to the United States.
Id.
18. In 1985, the drug lords hired guerrillas to storm Colombia's Palace of Justice. In August
1986, an intimidated Colombian Supreme Court declared the extradition treaty with the United
States unconstitutional. In Dec-ember 1986, President Barco signed the treaty, bringing it back into
effect. In June 1987, the Colombian Supreme Court, intimidated by the cartel's threats, again ruled
that the extradition treaty was unconstitutional despite Barco's signature. Bagley, supra note 2, at
85-87.
19. For a history ofinterational drug control, see generally S. CHATTERJEE, LEGAL ASPECTS
OF INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL (1971); Note, International Narcotics Control: A Proposal to
Eradicate an International Menace, 14 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 530 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Interna-
tional Narcotics Control]; Note, Trends in Extraterritorial Narcotics Controb Slamming the Stable
Door After the Horse Has Bolted, 16 INT'L L. & POL. 353 (1984).
20. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298
discussed in Note, International Narcotics Control, supra note 19, at 544-45.
21. Single Convention, supra note 20, arts. 23, 25, 26, 28, 31.
22. Id., art. 19.
23. Id., arts. 35, 36. The 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
provides for the cooperative extradition of individuals who commit serious crimes. It also provides
for the education, treatment, rehabilitation, and social reintegration of drug abusers. Id. Amend-
ment of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 25-Aug. 8, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 1439, 1451-52,
T.I.A.S. No. 8118.
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pal level by educating potential drug users, prohibiting the use and sale of
illicit drugs, and rehabilitating addicts.24 The government seeks to re-
duce the drug supply as well by prohibiting municipal production and
interdicting drugs at the nation's borders.25 Additionally, the United
States has entered into treaties prohibiting money laundering and other
drug-related crimes26 and providing for the extradition and prosecution
of drug traffickers.27 The most radical initiative yet launched by the U.S.
government is Operation Snowcap.28 This operation was undertaken
pursuant to a 1983 treaty between Bolivia and the United States.2 9
Under the treaty, the Bolivian government allowed the U.S. military to
enter Bolivian territory and aid the Bolivian police force in its drug en-
forcement operations.3"
24. Eisenach, supra note 6, at 37-38. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., WHAT WORKS: SCHOOLS
WITHOUT DRUGS (1987). The Reagan administration adopted a "zero tolerance" approach in the
federal workplace. Eisenach, supra note 6. Presumably, the Bush administration will continue this
policy. For a discussion of the general ineffectiveness of rehabilitation programs, see GREATER
WASHINGTON RESEARCH CENTER, DRUG USE AND DRUG PROGRAMS IN THE WASHINGTON MET-
ROPOLITAN AREA: AN ASSESSMENT, Feb. 1988 (Executive Summary).
25. See Sealing the Borde" The Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction,
REUTERS (1988).
26. For example, the United States has entered Mutual Legal Assistance Tactics (MLATs) with
several countries, including Switzerland, Turkey, the Netherlands, and Italy. See Note, Preventing
Billions from Being Washed Offshore: A Growing Approach to Stopping International Drug Traffick-
ing, 14 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. AND CoM. 65, 79-80 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Preventing Billions].
27. See generally Note, Extradition Treaty Improvements to Combat Drug Trafficking, 15 GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 285 (1985).
28. This operation was legalized in the United States by a 1981 amendment to the Posse
Comitas Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-378 (1982). See Note, A Proposal for Direct Use of the United States
Military in Drug Enforcement Operations Abroad, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 291 (1988) [hereinafter Note, A
Proposal]. The amendment allows the Pentagon to offer support to the civilian agencies charged
with drug interdiction. Morrison, The Pentagon's Drug Wars, 18 NAT'L J. Sept. 6, 1986, at 2104-09.
29. The treaty provided for a three-prong strategy. First, the U.S. military would maintain
strikes at the laboratories to keep the price of the coca leaf low and reduce incentives to cultivate it.
Second, the government would offer farmers financial incentives to destroy the coca crop. And
third, Bolivia would pass a law making the cultivation, possession, and sale of coca leaves illegal,
except for traditional purposes. Statement of Dr. Guillermo Bedregal, Foreign Minister of Bolivia,
to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., Federal Information Systems Corp., Federal News
Service, Oct. 3, 1988.
30. The first phase of Operation Snowcap, Operation Blast Furnace, involved a C-5A transport
plane, six Army Black Hawk helicopters armed with .30-caliber machine guns, and 160 U.S. troops
armed with M-16 machine guns in a crop eradication and laboratory destruction effort over a period
of six months. The operation occurred in the Beni Region near Santa Cruz, Bolivia. See DeMott,
Striking at the Source, TIME, July 28, 1986, at 12; Shannon, Guns, Drugs and Politics, NEWSWEEK,
July 28, 1986, at 26. See infra note 31. For a discussion of the legality of Operation Blast Furnace
under municipal law, see Note, Operation Blast Furnacea The United States Involvement in Bolivia to
Put Heat on Drug Traffickers, 2 J. INT'L DISPUTE RESOLUTION 175 (1987). Operation Blast Fur-
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Notwithstanding the wide array of weapons in the drug-war arsenal,
the United States is losing the battle against drugs.31 Due to the escalat-
ing severity of the drug problem and the perceived ineffectiveness of cur-
rent control measures, political pressure is mounting to take new and
unprecedented control measures. 32  American officials have discussed
sending troops into Colombia.33 Obtaining the Colombian government's
consent to such an action, however, seems unlikely 34 and may in fact be
counterproductive.35 Sending troops into Colombia to eradicate cocaine
nace serves as the model for this Note's hypothetical military action. See infra notes 40-42, 112-27
and accompanying text.
31. Each year, the United States' expenditure to battle drugs escalates. In fiscal year 1988, the
federal government spent nearly $2.5 billion on drug-law enforcement, up sharply from $806 million
in fiscal year 1981. Eisenach, supra note 6, at 35-36. Yet drug production has increased continually.
Opium production has tripled since 1984 and heroin production has increased 10 times during the
same period. See Note, Preventing Billions, supra note 26, at 65 n.2 (citing U.N. Report Links Drugs,
Arms, Traffic, and Terrorism, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1987, at B7, col. 4).
Even extreme military measures, such as Operation Snowcap, may prove ineffective. Charles
Krause observed that "like so many other battles in the war on drugs, Operation Blast Furnace was
largely a failure." The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour (PBS television broadcast, March 1, 1988) (tran-
script no. 3242). See also Newsday, Jan. 1, 1989, at 1, col. 1; Christian Science Monitor, July 1,
1987, at 1, col. 3. But see N. Y. Times, July 2, 1989, at 1, col. 3 (Operation Blast Furnace successful
in stopping traffickers during the operation). Most commentators attribute the futility of the task to
the huge profits generated by the drug trade. The Medellin Cartel alone is reputed to earn from $2
billion to $4 billion a year. Approximately $2.5 to $3 billion a year in profits are repatriated to
Colombia, where drugs now rank above coffee (which earns $2 to $2.5 billion) as the country's
leading export. Bagley, supra note 2, at 70. Peru and Bolivia reap greater revenue from the cocaine
trade than all other exports combined. Gardner, supra note 15, at 1.
32. Clarence Edgar Melvin, the leader of Operation Blast Furnace, see supra notes 28-30, stated
that "the only thing that will work is force. I see it as a war. It's a threat to our national security at
the same level as a military threat from another nation or a group of nations." How to Lose the Coke
War, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1987, at 22. Melvin's proposed solution is blunt: "International-
ize a strike force. Arrest the major traffickers. Put them in jails where they would stay.., destroy
their means of production, the millions of dollars' worth of chemicals that they have around their
laboratories and factories. I would burn their houses down, is what I would do." Id. According to
Melvin, it would take only a few weeks to cripple the cocaine trade in Bolivia using modern intelli-
gence. Id.
33. See infra note 36.
34. Applying political pressure on the Colombian government would probably not produce
desired results. The Colombian government views such coercion as a threat to its national sover-
eignty. In addition, governmental corruption and criminal coercion prevent the Colombian govern-
ment from iequesting U.S. aid. Virtually all factions on Bolivia's political spectrum condemned
Operation Blast Furnace. Bagley, supra note 2, at 90. Furthermore, most other Latin American
countries, including Colombia and Mexico, rejected such action as a viable solution. Id.
35: From the perspective of military logistics, experience proves that obtaining the consent of a
drug-producing nation before deploying troops removes the element of surprise and renders the
action ineffective. Once Operation Blast Furnace was publicly disclosed, "the crucial element of
surprise was lost." Shannon, supra note 30, at 26. Another author observed that "the splash of
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crops and processing facilities without the Colombian government's con-
sent therefore remains a viable option.36 Indeed, there is evidence that
U.S. policymakers view nonconsensual military action as a possible
alternative.37
For purposes of analyzing the legality of U.S. military action in Co-
lombia to thwart the drug war, this Note assumes that the hypothetical
action38 would be similar to Operation Blast Furnace, the first phase of
the U.S.-Bolivian Operation Snowcap.39 Operation Blast Furnace in-
unwanted publicity removed the surprise, ensuring that most of the big drug traffickers would be out
of the country before the forces arrived." Demott, supra note 30, at 12. The drug lords knew about
the operation because "[they] tend to be better armed and better organised than any government
agency, with ... computer-tracking of shipments, high-speed communications and early-warning
systems." Debusmann, supra note 16, at 49.
36. Currently, there is minimal support for undertaking noncensensual action. Given the vola-
tility, unpredictability, and political importance of the drug war, however, such action must always
be considered a viable option.
37. On April 8, 1986, then President Reagan declared drug trafficking a "national security
risk" and authorized the use of military force against it. See Demott, supra note 35, at 12-13. Fur-
thermore, President Bush issued a classified National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) authoriz-
ing the use of U.S. combat forces to accompany Colombian forces on narcotics patrols. Wash. Post,
Sept. 10, 1989, at Al, col. 6. The Colombian government, however, has not consented to such an
action.
Although drug czar William Bennett publicly has altered his position since 1988, at that time he
advocated the use of unilateral military force abroad to prevent the growth and manufacture of
illegal drugs targeted at this country. He stated that "[i]t is to be hoped we can do this in collabora-
tion with foreign governments, but if need be we must consider doing this by ourselves." L.A.
Times, Unilateral Force Against Drugs Overseas Urged, Mar. 3, 1988, at 3, col. 3. He further stated
that, "[w]e are a great and sovereign people and we must protect our children." US. Military Force
Proposed Against Drug Trafficking, REUTER LIBR. REP., Mar. 3, 1988. Congress created the job of
"drug czar" in October 1988. The drug czar is responsible for devising a national drug-control
strategy and for coordinating the efforts of government agencies that battle drug supply and demand.
Editorial, Bennett the Menace, L.A. Times, Jan. 13, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
Many military officials believe that such an operation would provide an ideal training exercise for
the military. "To operate far displaced from normal supply distribution points over topography they
are not familiar with.., what greater training for low-intensity conflict?" Morrison, supra note 28,
at 2107.
38. Creating a hypothetical situation is both necessary and productive for analyzing the legality
of any action. Because the U.S. government has not attempted a unilateral response to the Colom-
bian drug importation problem, one must assume the situation. To avoid analysis until such a situa-
tion arises, however, would be to shut the barn door after the horse has left. The facts posed by
Operation Blast Furnace have been selected because that operation represents the only documented
use of the U.S. military in such a drug enforcement operation: combat troops and Black Hawk
helicopters are apparently the Pentagon's logistical choice for small-scale interventions in Central
America. See Heavy Flak in the Drug War, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 18, 1989, at 16
(combat troops and Black Hawk helicopters proposed in anticipation of raid on drug lord Pablo
Escobar).
39. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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volved a C-5A transport plane, six Army Black Hawk helicopters armed
with .30-caliber machine guns, and 160 U.S. troops armed with M-16
machine guns in a crop eradication and laboratory destruction effort over
a period of six months. In the hypothetical, however, the action would
be performed without the consent of the Colombian government.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE USE OF FORCE
International law on the use of force governs the legality of the United
States' hypothetical military action.' The United Nations Charter regu-
lates the use of force in international relations. At the heart of the Char-
ter, Article 2(4) provides that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territo-
rial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other man-
ner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."41 Article 51
represents the only express exception to Article 2(4) available for individ-
ual states. 42 It assures that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed at-
tack occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . .,,4
40. Article 38 of the International Court of Justice identifies the following sources of interna-
tional law (in descending order of precedence): (a) international conventions (or "treaties") estab-
lishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) international customary law; (c) the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and (d) the writings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38.
International law differs significantly from American municipal law. First, municipal law gener-
ally governs individuals, while international law regulates states. L. HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 10-11 (2d ed. 1987) (citing H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 215-17 (Knight trans. 1967)).
Second, municipal law binds all citizens, with or without their explicit consent. To the contrary,
international law requires the consent of affected states. Id. at 36 (citing 0. SCHACHTER, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 178 Rec. des Cours 60-61 (1982)). Third, international
law has no statutes applicable to all states. A treaty binds only those states that have specifically
ratified it. Id. at 69-88. Fourth, customary law is determined by the conduct of states over long
periods of time. State practice thus creates customary law. Additionally, the practice of interna-
tional organizations, such as the U.N. General Assembly, may create customary law. Once custom-
ary law is created, it becomes binding on all states. Id. at 37-69. See infra notes 77-101 and
accompanying text. Finally, in municipal law, scholarly writings are either normative or descriptive.
However, the works of highly regarded publicists serve as a source of international law, albeit a
subsidiary source. The opinions of these scholars thus represent substantive evidence of interna-
tional law. L. HENKIN, supra, at 111-13.
41. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
42. Article 51 is one of two Charter exceptions to Article 2(4)'s general prohibition of the use of
force. Article 51 excepts individual state defensive action. The other exception, embodied in Articles
39 through 45, permits collective force under the auspices of the United Nations. U.N. CHARTER
arts. 39-45.
43. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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This Part will first identify the type of conduct prohibited by Article
2(4). It will then explore the circumstances under which a state may act
in self-defense under Article 51. Scholars have construed Article 51 in
two ways. Because the legality of any defensive action under interna-
tional law depends upon which interpretation the international legal
community adopts, this section will analyze the different views.'
A. The Article 2(4) Prohibition on the Use of Force
1. "Use of Force"
Article 2(4) prohibits only the "use of force.",45 Not every exercise of
power by a state within the territorial domain of another state constitutes
a use of force.46 The determination of when an action rises to the level of
force requires an analysis of both the type and magnitude of the action.
Regarding the type of action, two principles emerge. First, Article
2(4) indisputably prohibits the sending of armed troops into another
state.47 Second, an action need not meet resistance to constitute a use of
force. For example, Professor Brownlie agreed with the International
Court of Justice that a British navy mine-sweeping operation in Albanian
territorial waters constituted a use of force, even though Albania was
powerless to prevent the act and offered no resistance. 48 Thus, a military
44. These two views are referred to as permissive and restrictive. See infra notes 67-101 and
accompanying text.
45. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Although one aim of the Charter was to ban
"the scourge of war," see infra note 67 and accompanying text, Article 2(4)'s language is not so
restrictive. Use of the term "use of force," as opposed to "war," may represent an attempt to avoid
circumvention of the Charter by nations calling their actions "incidents" or "conflicts." See Rbling,
The Ban on the Use of Force and the U.N. Charter, THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE
USE OF FORCE 3, 4 (A. Cassese ed. 1986) (giving the example of Japan's characterizing its war in
Manchuria as an "incident").
46. Findlay, Abducting Terrorists Overseas for Trial in the United States: Issues of International
and Domestic Law, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 25 (1988).
47. "There can be little doubt that 'use of force' is commonly understood to imply a military
attack, an 'armed attack,' by the organized military, naval or air forces of a state .. " I. BROWN-
LIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 361 (1963). While some scholars
have defined the term "use of force" under Article 2(4) to include mere economic coercion or exer-
cise of power without the use of arms, see H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Tucker 2d ed. 1966) (unarmed force) and Zourek, La definition de l'agression et le diroit interna-
tional Developpements ricents de la question, 92 HAGUE RECuEmL 834 (1957) (economic force),
Professor Brownlie finds both economic and unarmed force beyond the intended scope of Article
2(4). See I. BROWNLIE, supra, at 362.
48. Commenting on the Corfu Channel Case, Memorial of the United Kingdom (U.K. v. Alb.),
1949 I.C.J. 4, Professor Brownlie stated that "such actions are a form of dictatorial intervention and
would seem to involve a use of force." I. BROWNLIE, supra note 47, at 363. In the Corfu Channel
1990)
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action, whether or not it meets resistance, probably falls within the ambit
of Article 2(4)'s prohibition.
It is more difficult, however, to determine the magnitude of action nec-
essary to rise to the level of force. The Charter sheds no light on this
question. Theorists have labeled some small-scale interventions a "use of
force." For example, most scholars consider the Israeli rescue operation
in Entebbe 9 a use of force. Although thirteen people were killed, this
action involved only three planeloads of commandos,5" took only 90 min-
utes to complete,51 and occurred on a single airstrip.52 On the other
hand, theorists do not consider a single sniper attack or small explosion
killing one civilian a use of force.53 Apparently, the magnitude of an
action necessary to constitute force depends on a number of variables,
including the number of troops involved, the number of people killed,
and the type and size of machinery and equipment used to effectuate the
action.
2. 'Against the Territorial Integrity... of Any State"
Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force "against the territorial integrity
... of any State." 54 This language similarily raises interpretive problems.
There are presently three interpretive camps. Under one view, Article
2(4) prohibits any use of force. Scholars adopting this view maintain that
the phrase "against the territorial integrity" merely emphasizes the pro-
hibition on the use of force, and does not restrict the substantive meaning
of Article 2(4).-" Both the second and third camps interpret Article 2(4)
Case, Albania challenged the British navy's mine-sweeping operation in Albanian territorial waters.
Notwithstanding Albania's inability to resist the action, the International Court of Justice held that
Britain had violated Albania's sovereignty. But see Findlay, supra note 46, at 25. ("if United States
agents... do not encounter armed forces or authorities of the territorial state, self-help may be a
permissible means of responding to past wrongs and preventing future ... attacks").
49. On June 27, 1976, four PLO members hijacked an Air France Airbus to Entebbe, Uganda,
where six more hijackers boarded. The hijackers demanded the release of 53 prisoners from Israel
and other countries. The crew believed the hijackers received assistance from Ugandan armed
forces, although President Amin denied the allegation. On July 3, three planeloads of Israeli com-
mandos made a surprise landing at the airstrip, killed all the hijackers, and freed the hostages. Three
hostages were killed during the raid. Sheehan, The Entebbe Raid: The Principle of Self.jHelp in
International Law as Justification for State Use of ,4rmed Force, I FLETCHER F. 135, 146-47 (1977).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 146 n.47.
52. Id. at 147.
53. Findlay, supra note 46, at 32.
54. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
55. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 47, at 267 (language intended "to give more specific guarantees to
[Vol. 68:129
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as prohibiting only force employed against the territorial integrity of an-
other state.56
Members of the second and third camps, however, disagree with re-
spect to when an action threatens the "territorial integrity" of a state.
Under the second view, any use of force on the territory of a nonconsent-
ing state violates that state's territorial integrity. 7 Scholars rejecting this
broad reading, however, assert that force taking place within a state
whose government lacks some degree of control over its territory does
not violate that state's territorial integrity.58 Most publicists adhering to
this third interpretation require that the government lack control over its
entire territory. 9 Some commentators stretch the argument even fur-
small states"); R6ling, supra note 45, at 4. According to Rbling, this language in Article 2(4) is
simply a codification of Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Id.
56. Paust, Entebbe and Self-Help: The Israeli Response to Terrorism, I FLETCHER F. 86, 89-90
(1977). Paust asserts that Article 2(4) proscribes three types of coercion:
(1) that employed against the territorial integrity of a state,
(2) that employed against the political independence of a state, or
(3) that employed in any other manner inconsistant with the purposes of the Charter.
Id. at 90.
This argument was first advanced during oral argument in the Corfu Channel case. See Gordon,
Article 2(4) in Historical Context, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 271, 275 (1985) (force is permissable as long
as it is not directed against the integrity of the invoked state's territorial boundaries or its indepen-
dence) (citing Memorial of the United Kingdom (U.K. v. Alb.), 1948 I.C.J. Pleadings (3 Corfu
Channel) 295-96 (Public Sitting of Nov. 11-12, 1948) (statement of Sir Eric Beckett)). See also J.
STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 43, 95 (1958) (syntactically, Article 2(4) does not consti-
tute an absolute prohibition of force, which would have been the result had the Article ended with
the words "threat or use of force").
57. See M. SORENSEN, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 253, 254 (1968), cited in
Findlay, supra note 46, at 16.
58. See infra notes 59-61.
59. One publicist observed that "one can construct an interpretation of 2(4) that justifies the use
of armed force against groups that are operating in a vacuum of governmental authority." Gordon,
supra note 56, at 277. Statehood requires a national legal order, which ceases to be valid as soon as it
loses effectiveness. H. KELSEN, supra note 47, at 383, quoted in W. HOLDER, THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM 162 (1972). For example, in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), a U.S. agent
traveled to Peru to take custody of a suspected criminal. The agent failed to comply with a then-
existing U.S.-Peruvian extradition treaty by failing to produce extradition papers. He failed to do so
because Peru was occupied by Chilean forces. Two commentators have argued that the Chilean
occupation of Peru deprived the Peruvian government of standing to complain about the United
States' violation of Peru's territorial integrity. See M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION:
UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE § 3-2 (1983); Cardozo, When Extradition Fails, Is Abduction
the Solution?, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 127, 133 (1953), cited in Findlay, supra note 46, at 17. Likewise,
the United States' action in Germany following World War II did not violate Germany's territorial
integrity because the German government lacked actual control over its territory. See Chandler v.
United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949); M. BAssIOUNI, supra,
§ 3-3; Cardozo, supra, at 33.
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ther, requiring that the state lack control over only most of its territory.6 °
Little support exists for this latter view.61
B. The Article 51 Self-Defense Exception to Article 2(4)
The self-defense provision contained in Article 51 may justify a mili-
tary action otherwise violative of Article 2(4).62 Article 51 effectively
allows a member of the United Nations to defend itself against an armed
attack militarily without violating Article 2(4). It provides that
"[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a mem-
ber of the United Nations, until the Security Council [acts] ....
Two interpretations of Article 51 have evolved-the restrictive view
and the permissive view.64 Under the restrictive view, defensive action is
60. See Findlay, supra note 46, at 16-17. Findlay used Lebanon as an example for this argu-
ment. The government of Lebanon actually controls only a tiny portion of the nation's territory.
Most of the country is either occupied by Syrian or Israeli troops or controlled by various militia.
Therefore, Findlay argues, Lebanon currently has no control over persons or property within its
jurisdiction. Id. at 17. Conventional notions of sovereignty and territorial integrity are thus nonsen-
sical when applied to Lebanon and cannot serve as the predicate for duties under international law.
Id. Another commentator has adopted a similar approach to suggest that the United States could
use military personnel in Colombia to combat drug trafficking without the Colombian government's
consent. See Note, A Proposal for Direct Use of the United States Military in Drug Enforcement
Operations Abroad, 23 TEx. INT'L L.J. 291, 306-07 (1988) ("Colombia, where the drug trade is
careening out of the government's control, no longer can lay claim to sovereign control over [its]
borders ... The United States could not violate a sovereignty that Colombia no longer possesses
Professor Paust has carried this argument even further, suggesting that action in the territory of a
nonconsenting state may not violate that state's territorial integrity, even if the state retains effective
control over its entire territory. See Paust, supra note 56, at 90 (Entebbe raid, although on territory
of another state, did not threaten that state's territorial integrity). This Note does not address
Paust's novel view.
61. The minority view seems incorrect. Even if a government lacks control over most of its
territory, the state may retain territorial integrity. For example, the United States maintained terri-
torial integrity during the civil war, although the government lacked control over half its territory.
See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 653-54 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952) (all states that
do not declare the contrary have a duty to remain neutral with respect to a civil war in another
state). Likewise, all states have a duty of neutrality toward a state under seige by a belligerent
liberation movement, even if the movement occupies major blocks of territory. Id. This principle
illustrates that rights based on territorial integrity and sovereignty apply with equal force to states
that lack control over their territory. Id.
62. See supra notes 45-61 and accompanying text.
63. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. The Security Council "acts" under Chapter VII, which authorizes
the council to utilize collective force to "restore international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER
art. 39.
64. The Charter's provisions on the use of force must be reasonably construed. Accordingly,
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justified only in response to an armed attack.65 Under the permissive
view, defensive action is justified whenever it would be justified under
customary international law.66 An understanding of the Article 51 ex-
ception, therefore, requires an analysis of the concept of "armed attack"
and the circumstances under which customary law justifies a defensive
response. Finally, must a state be implicated in the attack before defen-
sive action on its territory is justified? And if so, what level of conduct is
required to implicate a state in the attack?
1. The Restrictive View
Theorists advocating the restrictive view of Article 51 emphasize the
Charter's primary purpose-to abolish war.6 7 They stress that any use of
force could escalate into war, and therefore seek to limit the circum-
stances under which a state legally may resort to force in self-defense.68
Although customary law existing prior to the Charter's adoption gener-
ally permitted defensive acts, 69 restrictive advocates maintain that Arti-
cle 51 replaced this broad customary privilege. Rather, the Charter
embodies a single narrow exception: a state may take defensive measures
only in response to an "armed attack."
7°
The U.N. Charter, however, does not define "armed attack." The
meaning of this phrase "remains as indeterminate legally as it was when
this Note identifies two accepted constructions-the restrictive and the permissive. For an example
of the restrictive view, see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 47. For an example of the permissive view, see
J. STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH CONSENSUS (1977) and J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD OR-
DER (1958).
65. See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 75-101 and accompanying text.
67. "WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war .... U.N. CHARTER preamble. See R61ing, supra note 55, at
3-4 (underlying purpose of Article 2(4) to outlaw scourge of war).
68. Rbling, supra note 45, at 6.
69. For a discussion of the approach under customary law, see supra note 40.
70. Restrictivists refuse to accept the permissive argument that the words "inherent right.., of
self-defense" were intended to incorporate the customary right of self-defense. They argue that such
a conclusion undermines the Charter's goal of limiting possible justifications for resort to force by
subjecting the Charter to a wide and illusive range of interpretation. Schachter, In Defense of Inter-
national Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 133-34 (1986). Thus, for the restric-
tivists, the framework of the Charter is clear: a state may use force to repel an armed attack, but
may not use force against coercion short of an armed attack. Because the Security Council retains
authority to defend against unarmed coercion under Chapter VII, see supra note 63, the restrictive
interpretation may require a state to suffer an infringement of its rights until the Security Council
acts. Restrictive scholars justify this cost by stressing the overriding concern for the prevention of
war and its escalation. See Rbling, supra note 45, at 6.
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the Charter was drawn up, and can be freely construed case by case by its
authorized interpreters."71 Early interpreters equated the phrase with an
"ongoing military attack."'7 2 However, both logic and precedent support
relaxing the requirement that the attack be "ongoing," especially in the
situation of anticipatory self-defense.73 Notwithstanding the varying in-
terpretations of "armed attack," most commentators agree that the
phrase encompasses at least a "military" attack.74
71. One commentator stated:
the infrequency of precedents ... and the fact.., that condemnations of States' reactions
are dictated by a multitude of motives, among which a critical analysis of the debates and
resolutions cannot permit the inclusion of what in the last resort is the only decisive one,
make it impossible to find a definition of armed attack under the terms of Article 51 either
in UN practice or in that of its members.
Combacau, The Exception of Self-Defense in UN. Practice, THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF
THE USE OF FORCE 9, 23 (A. Cassese ed. 1986).
72. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 61, at 156; Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 876 (1947).
73. There is much support for interpreting Article 51 to allow "anticipatory" self-defense,
whereby a state acts in self-defense before it is under actual armed attack. Proponents of anticipa-
tory self-defense argue that, due to the existence of modem weapons of mass destruction and ex-
tremely short warning times, Article 51 could not reasonably exclude the right to defend against an
anticipated attack. As one scholar argued, "[a] state could not be expected to wait like a 'sitting
duck.'" Weber, Cuban Quarantine, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 136, 138
(1982). See also Note, Reading the U.N. Charter Connotatively: Toward a New Definition of Armed
Attack, 19 INT'L L. & POL. 395 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Reading the U.N. Charter]; Note, Tensions
Between International Law and Strategic Security: Implications of Israel's Preemptive Raid on Iraq's
Nuclear Reactor, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 459 (1984); Comment, The Sun Sets on Tamuz 1: The Israeli
Raid on Iraq's Nuclear Reactor, 13 CAL. WEST. INT'L L.J. 86 (1983).
74. Irrespective of the current lack of support for extending "armed attack" to nonmilitary
events, the idea has logical appeal and may become more prevalent. Some publicists have acknowl-
eged that a nonmilitary attack may be even more dangerous than a military attack. For example,
Nanda states:
Revolutionary changes in science and technology with their impact on armaments, the so-
called "wars of national liberation," and highly sophisticated and refined mechanisms of
carrying on subversive activities might, after all, prove as dangerous to the "political inde-
pendence" and "territorial integrity" of a nation state as an open armed attack.
Nanda, The United States Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order-Part II,
44 DENVER L.J. 225, 225-43 (1967), quoted in B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER 313 (1980).
Even those mandating a strict approach would concede that dumping cyanide into a river flowing
across the border would constitute an armed attack. This reasoning leads to interesting, logical
results. For example, would restrictivists also concede that secretly shipping great quantities of
cyanide-laced food across the borders constitutes an armed attack? If so, would they concede that
sending drugs, which cause thousands of deaths and billions in property damage, is an armed attack?
Many government officials have accepted the notion that such acts rise to the level of armed
attacks. For example, U.S. Customs Commissioner William Von Raab suggested that President
Bush should treat the drug problem like President Reagan treated the Libyan chemical weapons
plant. "'[The Libyan plant] was unlikely to distribute any of its chemicals [beyond Libya's bor-
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2 The Permissive View
Proponents of the permissive view emphasize that the Charter compels
states to fulfill their obligations under international law.75 Expanding the
scope of the self-defense exception available for individual states under
Article 51 would further this goal.76 Accordingly, the permissive view
maintains that Article 51 fully incorporates the customary law of self-
defense and thus permits actions the restrictive view would exclude.7 7
Incorporation of the customary privilege finds support in Article 51's
reference to the "inherent right" of self-defense.78
a. Forcible Self-Help
Because the permissive interpretation of Article 51 relies on the cus-
tomary law of self-defense, it is necessary to determine the bounds of this
customary privilege. Under customary law, a state clearly may respond
with force to a legal wrong amounting to an armed attack.79 It is un-
clear, however, whether customary law justifies "forcible self-help" 8 as a
legitimate response to a nonmilitary action, such as the production and
ders],' he said, 'yet today, in our own hemisphere, hundreds of poison chemical plants operate with
impunity, churning out deadly chemicals for direct export to the United States.'" War on Drugs
Urged Abroad, NEWSDAY, Feb. 8, 1989, at 4.
75. "WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED... to establish
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources
of international law can be maintained ...." U.N. CHARTER preamble.
76. See Roling, supra note 45, at 4.
77. Treaties often codify existing customary international law. Note, Reading the UN. Char-
ter, supra note 73, at 397 n.6 (citing M. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREA-
TIES 146 (1985)). See supra note 40.
78. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. Because the framework of the restrictive view
lacks an essential protective component, states have refused and will most likely continue to refuse to
adopt it. Under the restrictive view, a law-abiding state could not rectify violations of its rights
unless met with an armed attack. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. This result does not
comport with the Charter's strong and repeated emphasis on the requirements of justice and respect
for the obligations of international law. See supra note 75. Moreover, states subject to an unarmed
attack cannot rely on help from a politically polarized Security Council. The restrictive view thus
renders the Charter ineffective in protecting state rights. J. STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH CONSEN-
sus (1977).
79. See Schachter, supra note 70, at 120. In this regard, the permissive view does not diverge
from the restrictive view of Article 51. See supra note 71-74 and accompanying text. For a further
discussion of customary law as a source of international law, see supra note 40 and infra notes 82-94
and accompanying text.
80. Both self-defense and self-help are potential justifications for acts that would otherwise be
illegal under the Charter, and both are reactions to a prior violation of international law. For ease of
terminology, "self-defense" will refer to actions in response to military attacks, and "forcible self-
help" will refer to actions in response to other legal wrongs.
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shipment of illicit drugs.81
The privilege of forcible self-help existed prior to the Charter's adop-
tion. 2 According to permissivists, this privilege survived the adoption of
the Charter and remains an integral part of the Charter. Customary law,
however, can be superseded by customary norms that subsequently
evolve.8 3 For a pattern of behavior to achieve the status of a customary
norm, the states must repeat their behavior continually out of a sense of
legal obligation.14 Thus, if states have regularly refrained from forcible
self-help since the adoption of the Charter, a new customary norm
prohibiting such defensive action will have emerged, defeating the ration-
ale behind the permissive view.8 5
Common practice, however, suggests that states do not regularly re-
frain from forcible self-help. Since 1945, states have resorted to numer-
ous acts of extraterritorial forcible self-help. 6 The Entebbe raid,87 the
81. Because the United States prohibits the exportation of illicit drugs to its borders, such activ-
ity constitutes a legal wrong against the United States. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
The production of illegal substances clearly violates the Single Convention as well. See supra notes
19-23 and accompanying text. Exporting illicit drugs, however, does not rise to the level of an
armed attack. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Military response to such action would
thus represent forcible self-help rather than self-defense. See supra note 80.
82. "Customary international law had permitted states to engage in certain forms of extraterri-
torial self-help." Paust, supra note 56, at 87.
83. To the extent that Article 51 represents a codification of customary law, it assumes the
characteristics ofcustomary law, including the susceptability to change by a new code ofstate behav-
ior. J. BRIERLY, THE LAWS OF NATIONS 57-62 (6th ed. 1963), cited in Note, Reading the U.N.
Charter, supra note 73, at 397 n.6. See supra note 40.
84. Monaco, Sources of International Law, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 424, 427 (1982). See supra notes 40, 74-76 and accompanying text.
85. Many commentators have examined post-Charter examples of states resorting to forcible
self-help to determine whether these examples may establish a norm of customary law. See e.g.,
Bryde, Self-Help, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 215, 217 (1981) (although
"States have since 1945 resorted to numerous acts of self-help involving the use of force.., it cannot
be considered the nucleus for the development of new customary [law]"). These commentators,
however, assume that the privilege of forcible self-help did not exist before the Charter's adoption.
This Note, however, maintains that a customary privilege of forcible self-help did exist. See, e.g.,
infra note 97 (discussing the Caroline Incident). Because under the permissive view the Charter
incorporated existing customary law, this Note focuses on whether post-Charter practice disestab-
lished a customary privilege, rather than whether it established a customary privilege.
86. It is difficult to recognize the emergence of a norm of refraining from self-help because of
the difficulty in identifying a state's failure to act. It is much easier to identify instances in which
states have resorted to forcible self-help. Thus, if states have resorted to self-help in a substantial
number of cases, states are not regularly refraining from such conduct, and no new norm has
emerged.
Some examples of defensive action since the Charter's adoption were in response to military at-
tacks. While a response to a military attack ordinarily would constitute self-defense, these particular
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Cuban Missile Crisis, s8 the United States' intervention into Cambodia, 9
the Corfu Channel Case,9" the aborted U.S. raid into Iran,9 and South
Africa's attack of national liberation movements in neighboring territo-
ries92 all evidence the continuation of the customary privilege. More-
over, states do not recognize a legal obligation to refrain from forcible
self-help. For example, the United States has formulated a policy that
would allow states to use force to protect "vital interests." 93 The United
States could define as "vital interests" its foreign investments and re-
source supplies. The inclusion of such interests displays the lack of nor-
mative restraint inherent in the U.S. self-defense policy. 94 Therefore,
state practice since the Charter's adoption suggests that no new norm
prohibiting self-help has emerged. Under the permissive view, it seems
that the privilege to resort to forcible self-help remains a right inherent in
Article 51.
responses are characterized as self-help. See supra note 80. The defending state in each instance was
not attacked by the state in which the defensive action took place, but by political groups in that
state. Thus, the defensive action represents self-defense against the attacking groups and self-help
against the state.
87. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
88. See Weber, supra note 73, at 136.
89. Paust, supra note 56, at 91. The United States attacked enemy forces inside neutral Cambo-
dia when it became clear that Cambodia could not carry out its international responsibilities as a
neutral state. Cambodia's neutrality was essential to assure that enemy forces not use Cambodian
territory to attack U.S. and Allied troops in South Vietnam. Paust suggests that customary law
authorized such forms of self-defense inside neutral territory. Id.
90. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
91. Schacter, supra note 70, at 139.
92. Higginbotham, International Law, the Use of Force in Self-Defense, and the Southern Afri-
can Conflict, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529, 530-33 (1987).
93. Former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger set forth six factors that govern foreign use
of combat force by the U.S. government:
(1) Force should be used only for vital interests;
(2) If used, then it should be dedicated to winning;
(3) Winning should be clearly defined in relation to political and military objectives;
(4) The military capabilities required to win should be provided, and adjusted during the
course of combat as necessary;
(5) The whole undertaking should not be attempted without "some reasonable reassur-
ance" of broad backing by the American people and Congress;
(6) The commitment to force should be a last resort.
Falk, The Decline of Normative Restraint in International Relations, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 263, 266
(1985) (citing N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1984, at A1, col. 3 (speech before National Press Club, Nov. 28,
1984)).
94. See id. As one scholar noted, "[t]he theory that a State is entitled to defend all vital inter-
ests with military means is too dangerous.... It is the State itself which in the case of Art. 51 is
called upon to interpret its interests and to evaluate the pertinent facts." R61ing, supra note 45, at 7.
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b. Restraints on Forcible Self-Help
Three amorphous restraints limit a state's ability to resort to forcible
self-help. The first restraint emerges from U.N. General Assembly prac-
tice. While the U.N. General Assembly has neither confirmed nor re-
jected the forcible self-help interpretation,95 that body has been far less
likely to denounce uses of force when taken for reasons consistent with
the purposes of the U.N. Charter.96 Thus, if the privilege exists at all, the
Charter's purposes may limit a state's right to resort to forcible self-help.
The customary law of forcible self-help places two additional restraints
on states seeking to invoke the privilege.97 First, a state may invoke the
privilege only when "necessary."98 For an action to meet the necessity
requirement, the state must have as its motive the protection of an essen-
95. The practice of the U.N. General Assembly is considered a subsidiary source of evidence
establishing customary law. See supra note 40. Thus, the Assembly's actions may assist in determin-
ing the permissibility of forcible self-help under customary law. The General Assembly never has
supported, and often has denounced, resort to forcible self-help. See Combacau, supra note 71, at 17.
While one might interpret these denunciations to signal a rejection of the notion of forcible self-help,
they can be explained on two grounds. First, the states' actions exceeded the restraints on forcible
self-help. Id. at 26. These restraints are described infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text. Sec-
ond, the defensive actions contravened the purposes of the U.N. Charter. Id. The General Assem-
bly has been less willing to denounce forcible self-help when the conduct did not exceed self-help
restraints and when the reasons for using force were compelling and consistent with the Charter's
purposes. For example, the Security Council debated the Entebbe raid for four days. The Council
issued no resolutions or declarations and has not discussed the matter since. Sheehan, The Entebbe
Raid: The Principle of Self-Help in International Law as Justification for State Use ofArmed Force, I
FLETCHER F. 135, 146-47 (1977). General Assembly practice therefore leaves open the possibility
that a state may resort to forcible self-help, provided the state's objective is indisputably compatible
with the Charter and the state's action does not exceed the customary restraints on self-help.
96. See Combacau, supra note 71, at 17; supra note 95.
97. These traditional restraints on invocation of the privilege of forcible self-help were first
formulated in 1837 in the Caroline Incident. 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409
(1906). In the Caroline Incident, a group of Canadian insurgents attempted to overthrow British
rule in Canada. The insurgents received arms, supplies, and recruits from a ship, the Caroline,
docked in U.S. territory. The United States had unsuccessfully attempted to prohibit the insurgents'
activity. Consequently, a British force crossed into U.S. territory and destroyed the vessel, killing
two U.S. nationals in the process. Britain argued that its destruction of the Caroline was justified
under international law. United States Secretary of State Daniel Webster asserted that the right to
self-help is not absolute, but is limited by certain restraints. In the ensuing debate, the nations
agreed with Webster's formulation of the law, but disagreed over its application to the case. Id. at
536. For an interesting discussion of the Caroline Incident, see Higginbothom, supra note 92, at 535-
36.
98. In response to the Caroline Incident, discussed supra note 97, Webster argued that self-help
should be confined to instances in which "necessity ... is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." J. MOORE, supra note 97, at 409. On the pre-
Charter doctrine of necessity, see generally B. RODICK, THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1928).
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tial interest99 and must exhaust all less forcible means of protecting that
interest."° Second, once the privilege is invoked, the defensive response
must be "proportional" to the offensive action.101 In other words, a state
may take only defensive measures necessary to remedy the wrong.
3. Attribution of Responsibility
Both the restrictive and permissive interpretations of Article 51 focus
on what type of offensive conduct justifies resort to use of force as a de-
fense. 10 2 It remains unclear, however, whether responsibility for the of-
fensive acts-which could very well be carried out by individuals-must
be attributed to a state before defensive action can be taken on the terri-
tory of that state.' 3 Two views have developed: the traditional view and
the emerging view. The practice of the United Nations General Assem-
bly does not resolve this split in authority.' 4
99. According to the International Law Commission, examples of essential state interests in-
clude: 1) the state's existence; 2) the maintenance of conditions in which essential services can func-
tion; and 3) domestic peace. INT'L L. COMM'N, ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, I.L.C. Rep.
71 (1980).
100. See id. art. 33 ("The international wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with
what is required of it by an international obligation is precluded if the State had no other means of
safeguarding an essential State interest .... ") (emphasis added).
101. As originally articulated by Webster, this restraint demanded that self-help be "limited by
that necessity, and kept clearly within it." 2 J. MOORE, supra note 97, at 409. Bryde stated that "the
principle of proportionality had already been well established under general international customary
law and has to be regarded as implicit in the very notion of self-defense." Bryde, supra note 85, at
213.
102. See supra notes 64-101 and accompanying text.
103. For example, suppose individuals within state A perform acts against state B sufficient to
justify a defensive response under Article 51. Must state B await a formal attribution of responsibil-
ity to state A before responding defensively on the territory of state A ?
104. One line of cases before the General Assembly involved this issue. In each case, a state
responded to armed attacks on its territory by a neighboring state, not carried out by the latter's
army, but by members of a liberation movement based in that country. The victim states, Israel,
Portugal, and South Africa, carried out retaliatory actions in the territory of neighboring states. See
Combacau, supra note 71, at 26; Higginbotham, supra note 92, at 529. The United Nations has
repeatedly condemned these actions. Combacau, supra note 71, at 26. Yet these condemnations do
not necessarily endorse the traditional dualist view. They were instead prompted by the excessive-
ness of the countermeasures, and their delay in execution. Such factors qualified the actions as
illegal reprisals. Id. at 26-27. Moreover, the initial attack in each case came from a liberation move-
ment legitimated by the General Assembly. Id. See L. HENKIN, supra note 40, at 286 (referring to
two General Assembly Resolutions granting access to international forums to liberation movements
recognized by the Organization of African Unity). This factor established a separate ground for
invalidating the defensive actions. When the initial individual aggression is considered illegitimate
under the Charter, the United Nations has neither condemned nor approved defensive action. For
example, the United Nations did not rule on the Entebbe raid, although the issue was directly before
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Adherants to the traditional view steadfastly maintain that a state may
not take defensive action on the territory of another state unless acts suf-
ficient to warrant self-defense can be attributed to that state.'05 The
traditional view rests on the dualist doctrine, which maintains that inter-
national law regulates states, not individuals.' 6 Because an individual
cannot violate international law, a state may not justifiably react to indi-
vidual conduct that is not attributed to another state. According to the
International Law Commission, the attribution of responsibility to a state
follows common-law agency principles.'0 7 Thus, defensive action is justi-
fied under Article 51 when: (1) the individual aggressors are agents of a
state, 10 8 (2) a state assists the individual aggressors, 0 9 or (3) a state's
failure to prevent the attack constitutes a breach of an international
duty."o
Proponents of the emerging view assert that, in some circumstances, a
state may take self-defensive measures against individuals on the terri-
tory of another state, even absent attribution of responsibility for aggres-
sive acts to that state."' The emerging view focuses on the legal wrong
committed, rather than the aggressor. Rejecting the dualist notion, a
growing number of scholars note that both individual and state coercion
threaten the victim state's security. " 2 Under this view, therefore, Article
it. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. Lacking more conclusive precedent, it is thus
unclear whether a defensive action carried out in another state against individuals whose initial
actions were considered illegitimate under the Charter would be illegal under Article 2(4). Comba-
cau, supra note 71, at 24.
105. L. HENKIN, supra note 40, at 141.
106. Id. See supra note 40.
107. The International Law Commission appears to follow common-law agency principles. See
I.L.C. Rep. 171-74 (1976). The Commission mandates that "[tihe conduct of a person or a group of
persons not acting on behalf of the State shall not be considered as an act of the State under interna-
tional law." INT'L L. COMM'N, ARTICLES ON ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY, art. I1 (1976).
108. "The conduct of an organ of a State, (or) of a territorial governmental entity.., shall be
considered as an act of the State ... even if... the organ exceeded its competence according to
internal law or contravened instructions concerning its activity." INT'L L. COMM'N, ARTICLES ON
ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBLITY, art. 10.
109. The comments to the International Law Commision Report indicate that a state remains
wholly responsible both for the failure to prevent the action when a duty under international law is
imposed, and for acts of government organs affirmatively aiding an individual's conduct. I.L.C. Rep.
Comments (1975).
110. Id.
111. D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 56 (1958).
112. Professor Bowett suggests "[the traditional] position ... ignores the very real potentialities
for endangering a state's security which individuals possess .... Id. He thus proposes that interna-
tional law impose duties on individuals similar to those imposed on states. Id.
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51 protects a state's use of force in defense against individual
aggressors. 1 13
III. USE OF FORCE DOCTRINE APPLIED TO
THE HYPOTHETICAL ACTION
A. The Article 2(4) Prohibition on the Use of Force
1. "Use of Force"
This Part will analyze the legality of nonconsensual military action by
the United States against the Colombian drug lords. Specifically, this
section will consider whether the hypothetical action' 14 constitutes a
prima facie violation of Article 2(4).11'
The hypothetical action would constitute a "use of force," falling
within the scope of the Article 2(4) prohibition. 116 It necessarily would
involve armed troops seeking to destroy property. The action would re-
quire the equivalent of one C-5A transport plane, six Army Black Hawk
helicopters armed with .30-caliber machine guns, and 160 U.S. troops
armed with M-16 machine guns. 17 It would take place over a territory
approximately the size of the Beni region near Santa Cruz, Bolivia, and
would last a number of weeks."' Such action would exceed the magni-
tude of the Entebbe raid in territorial scope and duration, and would
involve a similar number of troops.' Therefore, the proposed military
action meets the type and magnitude requirements necessary to fall
within Article 2(4)'s proscription.' 20 That the Colombian government
113. Professor Bowett has written that
[although] the state on whose territory these preparations or activities occur is not in
breach of any duty, and therefore, no action in self-defense can be directed against it by the
state threatened ... the threatened state is [not] powerless to do anything to protect itself
.... [I]t may take action in self-defense but such action must be directed solely at the
individuals ... responsible for the ... violation of its rights.
Id. Although such defensive action may occur on another state's territory, the action cannot be
directed against the state. In this respect, both the traditional and the emerging views condemn
forcible self-help against a nonresponsible state.
114. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 45-61 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
117. This hypothetical action is the equivalent of the force used in Operation Blast Furnace, a
consensual military drug operation. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text. This Note, in hypothesizing an action
equivalent to a known military antidrug effort (see supra note 117), refrains from speculating on the
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may be powerless to offer resistance 21 does not defeat the action's status
as a use of force.122
2. "Against the Territorial Integrity... of Any State"
Under all three accepted interpretations of the language "against the
territorial integrity . . . of any State," the hypothetical military action
would violate Article 2(4). Under the first view, Article 2(4) prohibits
any use of force. 123 Because the U.S. action constitutes a use of force,
Article 2(4) prohibits it. The other constructions of Article 2(4) describe
it as proscribing only force violative of a state's territorial integrity.1 24
Under the second view, any action on the territory of a nonconsenting
state violates that state's territorial integrity.125 This encompasses the
hypothetical action, which necessarily would take place on Colombian
territory. Under the third view, a state's territorial integrity might be
violated only if the state loses control over substantially all of its terri-
tory. 126 Even under this restrictive reading of Article 2(4), the action
against Colombian drug lords would contravene the Charter. Although
guerrillas funded by drug lords and hostile to the Colombian government
control blocks of territory in Colombia, 27 evidence does not suggest this
situation is pervasive.' 28
legality of a smaller attack. However, as the size of the action decreases in an effort to avoid charac-
terization as a "use of force," the effectiveness of such an effort might become suspect.
121. Most drug-producing states presumably possess insufficient military strength to oppose an
unanticipated military incursion by the United States. See supra note 13.
122. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. This interpretation of Article 2(4) has not
been widely accepted. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 15.
128. Id. Most Colombian traffickers have no political goals beyond protecting their own profits,
While the situation described supra notes 14-18 represents a chaotic environment in Colombia, it
does not appear to represent the loss of control requisite to satisfy this alternative territorial integrity
view. This is not to say that the drug lords of Colombia, for example, are incapable of usurping and
fractionalizing Colombian territory to such an extent that the Colombian government effectively will
lack control over nearly all of its territory. If such a situation occurs, a nonconsensual military
action might not violate Article 2(4) under the last two interpretations of the "territorial integrity"
requirement. But see Note, A Proposal, supra note 28, at 306 (suggesting that, because "the drug
trade is careening out of the government's control, [such that the Colombian people] no longer can
lay claim to sovereign control over their own borders ...." U.S. military action would not contra-
vene international law).
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B. The Article 51 Self-Defense Exception
Notwithstanding a prima facie violation of Article 2(4), nonconsensual
action to combat the Colombian drug problem may be justifiable under
Article 51. The United States could argue that illicit drugs flowing
across its borders necessitate a defensive response. The success of this
argument hinges on whether one applies the restrictive or permissive
view of Article 51, as well as the choice of criteria for attribution of
responsibility.
L The Restrictive View
Under the restrictive view of Article 51, the only justification for use of
force in self-defense is a military attack. 129 Although Colombian drugs
cause severe damage in the United States, their shipment plainly does not
constitute a military attack.130 Therefore, the United States cannot jus-
tify a defensive response under the restrictive view of Article 51.
2. The Permissive View
The legality of the hypothetical military action under the permissive
view presents several difficulties. First, it is unclear whether the privilege
of forcible self-help exists at all under customary law.131 Second, if the
privilege does exist, states may invoke the privilege only under circum-
stances indisputably compatible with the purposes of the Charter. 132 The
General Assembly recognized the severe economic and social problems
associated with drug abuse and drug trafficking when it convened at the
Single Convention. 133 The express purposes of the Charter include solv-
ing "problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian charac-
ter . . "134 Thus, combatting the spread of illicit drugs furthers the
Charter's aims.
Third, assuming the customary privilege exists, the defensive action
must meet the privilege's substantive restraints: necessity and propor-
129. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
130. Violent acts attributable to the drug trade occur against U.S. nationals both abroad and
within U.S. borders. However, the instances of violence abroad are very limited. See supra notes 17-
18. Moreover, the causal link between internal violence and the drug trade is difficult to establish.
131. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
132. For a discussion of this limitation on the doctrine of forcible self-help, see supra notes 95-96
and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
134. U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. 3.
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
152 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
tionality.135 Necessity requires that the aggressive act threaten an essen-
tial state interest, and that the state exhaust all other means of protecting
that interest. 13 6 The drug crisis threatens the health and safety of U.S.
citizens and the economic stability of the United States-both essential
state interests.137 Before invoking the privilege, however, the U.S. gov-
ernment must have exhausted all less forcible means of protecting its in-
terests.138 The United States has put forth a substantial effort to stop the
flow of drugs across its borders.' 39 This effort has been ineffective, and
even the decision to dump more resources into the battle most likely
would prove futile."4 While this effort might satisfy the exhaustion re-
quirement, one could argue to the contrary that, as one of the richest and
most powerful nations, the United States possesses the resources to in-
crease the effectiveness of its current control measures, particularly at the
demand level. 4 '
To meet the proportionality requirement, the hypothetical action must
remain within the bounds necessary to prevent the flow of drugs across
U.S. borders. 42 The United States must identify clearly the crops and
laboratories producing drugs to be exported to the United States before
destroying them. 4 3 Troops must remain in Colombia a minimal amount
of time, and must be instructed not to fire weapons unless fired upon.
Also, the United States must articulate to the international community
that its sole objective is the destruction of illegal drugs bound for its
shores. '44
3. Attribution of Responsibility
Under the emerging view of attribution of responsibility, the United
States would not be barred from taking defensive action against individ-
135. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 99.
139. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
141. Bagley, supra note 2, at 71. The producer states have argued that the United States can
reduce its demand for illicit drugs, Whether increasing U.S. efforts at demand reduction will end the
drug crisis is a key factual issue subject to debate. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
143. The United States must establish that the drugs are bound for its borders in order to justify
its action solely on defensive grounds. Destroying drugs bound for another state probably would
exceed the force necessary to remedy the wrong committed against the United States.
144. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 68:129
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss1/9
MILITARY ACTION AGAINST DRUG LORDS
ual drug lords in Colombia by the absence of attribution of responsibility
to the Colombian government. 145 Under the traditional view, however,
acts sufficient to warrant self-defense must be attributable to Colombia
before U.S. action is justified.' 46 There is little public knowledge regard-
ing the Colombian government's involvement in the drug trade. The fol-
lowing paragraphs therefore describe a spectrum of possible courses of
conduct, which may or may not warrant the attribution of responsibility
for the drug traffickers' acts to the Colombian government:
(1) The Colombian government actively and effectively prohibits
the transfer of illicit drugs to the United States;
(2) The Colombian government actively but ineffectively prohibits
the transfer of illicit drugs to the United States, or acquiesces to
such transfer;
1 47
(3) Some Colombian government officials support the transfer of il-
licit drugs to U.S. destinations in contravention of government pol-
icy or in the face of government acquiescence; or
148
(4) Colombian government policy covertly or openly supports the
transfer of illicit drugs to the United States.' 49
In the first situation, Colombia has fulfilled its duty to prevent the
transfer of illicit drugs."5 ' The Colombian government has not violated
international law and the United States may not take defensive action
against it under the traditional view. In the second scenario, the drug
producers constitute "persons not acting on behalf of the State" under
145. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text. The drug-producing states argue that con-
sumption, rather than production, of drugs is responsible for the drug crisis. See supra notes 24, 141
and accompanying text. This argument, however, is not convincing under international law. The
shipment into the United States of illicit drugs by the producing state or its nationals constitutes the
international delict. U.S. consumers are not involved in the drug production or shipment, and thus
cannot be the cause of the breach of international law. The involvement of consumers is relevant,
however, with regard to the necessity of the proposed action. See supra note 143 and accompanying
text.
147. This is arguably the present situation in Bolivia. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying
text.
148. This is probably the most accurate description of the actual situation in Colombia. See
supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text. See also Morrison, supra note 28, at 2109 ("the President
of Columbia had to withdraw an entire army group from the field because of its increasing complic-
ity with drug traffickers").
149. This is arguably the present situation in both Colombia and Panama. See supra notes 13-18
and accompanying text.
150. The Single Convention imposes this duty on all ratifying states, including Colombia. See
supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
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the International Law Commission's attribution principles. 15' Colombia,
therefore, is not responsible for the affirmative acts of producers.
Although Colombia would be responsible for failing to prevent the pro-
duction of illicit drugs,' 52 this breach of international duty probably does
not rise to the level justifying defensive response.' 53
However, Colombia has breached its affirmative duty to thwart drug
production in the third situation.' 54 Moreover, the state may be directly
responsible for the affirmative acts of drug producers if the officials sup-
porting the drug activity constitute an "organ of a State."' 55 Even
subordinate agents, such as policemen, may constitute "organs" of states
under international law.'5 6 In the fourth situation, Colombia has affirm-
atively aided the drug producers and is thus responsible for their acts.' 57
The drug traffickers' acts therefore would be attributable to the Colom-
bian government.
IV. CONCLUSION
The analysis in Part III indicates that the hypothetical military action
in response to the Colombian drug traffickers almost certainly would vio-
late international law as formulated by the U.N. Charter. 5 The pro-
posed military action would constitute a prima facie violation of Article
2(4) under all but the most radical interpretations of that provision.' 59
Under the restrictive view of the Article 51 exception, the action would
not be justifiable as self-defense.' 6 ° Even under the permissive view, the
action is unlikely to be justifiable.' 6 ' While a reasonable case can be
made for the existence of the legal privilege to resort to forcible self-
help,' 62 the proposed military action would probably exceed the substan-
tive restraints on the privilege's invocation.' 63  Further, it is unclear
151. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 19-23, 150 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 62-112 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
156. See Zemanek, Responsibility of States: General Principles, in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLIT-
ICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 366 (R. Bernhardt ed. 1987).
157. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 31-53, 113-57 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 45-61, 114-22 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 67-74, 129-30 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 75-101, 131-44 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 95-101, 135-44 and accompanying text.
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whether one must attribute responsibility to the Colombian government
for the aggressive acts of the drug traffickers."6 Under the traditional
attribution-of-responsibility doctrine, no defensive action is justified ab-
sent such attribution. 65 Under the emerging view, however, attribution
is not an obstacle. 1
66
U.S. defensive action may depend upon whether the United States sup-
ports the permissive or restrictive view of Article 51. In the context of
nonconsensual military action against the drug lords, analysis of the pol-
icy concerns underlying the two views suggests that the United States
should support the permissive view. While the restrictivists seek the pre-
vention of full-scale war,167 the permissivists seek to ensure that states
comply with their obligations under international law.' 68 Because the
entire international community is likely to view any action directed at
eradicating the drug problem with considerable sympathy, 169 there ap-
pears minimal risk that the action will escalate into full-scale war. Cor-
respondingly, the need to adopt the restrictive view diminishes. The
United States therefore should support the the permissive view of Article
51.
Nevertheless, the proposed military action likely will be deemed illegal
under international law. How much of an effect should that illegality
have on the policy question of whether the United States should pursue
the proposed military action? International lawyers recognize that, be-
cause no sovereign power imposes formal sanctions for violations of in-
ternational law,17° attention to law is not the paramount or even
dominant motivation for national behavior. 17' Yet international law
does place a substantial limitation on a nation's freedom to act.' 72 The
164. See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 105-10, 146-57 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 111-13, 145 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
169. Bryde stated that "[i]n some cases the reasons for using force were so compelling that the
actions have met with considerable sympathy from large parts of the international community." See
Bryde, supra note 85, at 217.
170. J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 133 (1954), quoted in L.
HENKIN, supra note 40, at 1. The United Nations does authorize collective action to enforce the
Charter provisions. However, this mechanism is considered ineffective. See Cassese, Return to
Westphalia? Considerations on the Gradual Erosion of the Charter System, in THE CURRENT LEGAL
REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 505 (A. Cassese ed. 1986); Combacau, supra note 71, at 30
(failure of collective mechanism causes states to endure legal wrongs).
171. See L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 320-21 (2d ed. 1979).
172. Id. See infra note 40.
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violator of international law will be considered a violator by other states,
providing a measure of horizontal enforcement. 73 Additionally, the
United States has a substantial interest in maintaining the integrity of the
international legal system 174-an integrity jeopardized by every viola-
tion.175 Thus, consequential repercussions from any nonconsensual mili-
tary action should weigh against a U.S. Administration decision to take
such action in waging its war on drugs.
James R. Edmunds
173. L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 320-21 (2d ed. 1979).
174. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. See also I G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 12 (1940), cited in W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (3d ed. 1971) (The "effec-
tiveness [of international law] increases as the nations of the world find it not only to their benefit but
also to the benefit of the community of nations to conduct their relations according to ... generally
accepted standards ...").
175. No nation will build policy on law deemed ineffective. It would be unrealistic and danger-
ous to base government policy on laws not observed by other nations. L. HENKIN, How NATIONS
BEHAVE 320-21 (2d ed. 1979).
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